At this point, I am approximately halfway through the posts I have planned arguing for God's existence. Although the hardest posts are probably behind me, it is no surprise I might be feeling a short break is in order. But I am not taking a break from blogging completely. There have been numerous topics on my mind recently, which I made note of but "subdued" as I tried to stay focused on my philosophical work. But it is not worth delaying them any longer. A few recent discussions at church have ignited the flames for me, and the reluctance of people to consider deeper insight only stokes the embers. So it is time I weigh in on these
issues with more meaty discourse.
Therefore, today begins the first posts in a new mini-series on what I see as one of the most important topics in Christian life. What is that? It is, as the title implies, that magical cure-all word in Christianity - "faith". The use of this word has become so common-place in Christian discussions that it may as well serve as one of the "Top 5 Universal Answers to Sunday School Questions" (God, Jesus, Prayer, Bible and Faith) In my mind, that cheapens its meaning and usefulness, but more importantly it makes me wonder - are people sure they know what it means? Have they really thought through what they're saying or teaching? Can 1 word really convey such a broad use of meanings, as implied by the average church-goer?
Of course, I would answer in the negative, and for the next part of this series we will look at some ways faith is understood and think about their logical implications. In the meantime, let me clarify that faith is important to me - this is not a debate over how prominent this quality should be in our Christian lives. But looking closer at what it means in certain contexts, I believe, gives it more power for the witness of the church as it goes to win souls in the world. Think about it this way - we often tell people how important faith is, but does it make sense to them? Does it seem real? Does it give them anything other than warm fuzzies? Is there more to it than just "hope" and wishful thinking? Is it serving as a springboard to a deeper and more meaningful Christian life, or just a less stressful one?
In grappling with this subject, and thinking about how the word "faith" is used, I've tried - very hard - to listen to people explain their understanding of the word. That includes the use of the word from pastors and sermons. (sometimes in Christianity, bad teaching comes from pastors; other times, it's just because people aren't getting anything outside their 1 hour across from the pulpit) This can, for me, be like listening to nails on a
chalkboard - not because anyone's voice is that terrible, but I hear the
same things repeated ad nauseum. But I believe I finally have adequately grasped what people intend to say - I assume people mean the best! So I hope you find that to be true as I share with you.
In the end, I've come to one conclusion - people genuinely
have a grasp of faith that is partially correct. But too often, it is poorly explained and even more poorly lived out or applied. The very things that should strengthen and form our faith get ignored. Or, our faith can be tested and people fight just to pass. Instead, we should be waving a banner of victory with confidence and assurance. (Romans 8:31) This can't be done, I think, until we fully embrace a comprehensive understanding of what faith is and what it is not. And because it's such a central attribute to a strong Christian walk (Hebrews 11:6), I hope you would agree with me. So stay tuned, and you'll see how I came to these conclusions, and just how the word "faith" can be so controversial.
Tuesday, January 31, 2012
Friday, January 27, 2012
God's Existence, Part 6 - Fine-Tuned
Today's topic touches on something brought up in Part 4 - the concept that the universe is controlled by such precise constants, it must be a product of design. This is what is known as the anthropic argument, which is the next argument we will evaluate concerning the universe's origins. It is one of the more recent philosophical arguments for God's existence, making it very popular with people who are not even concerned with classic philosophy.
Anthropic means 'having to do with human beings' (intelligent life) - so the anthropic argument is speculating about the universe's setup for human life. First introduced to the scientific community by Brandon Carter in 1973 [1], the anthropic argument was intended to clarify the work of Copernicus (who believed mankind was not in a "privileged" position in the universe). Carter believed that although mankind may not be in the center of the universe, it was impossible for us to be in the universe if we were unable to witness it. In essence, the universe could not be "observed" if not made to include observers. If it was created in any way that deviates from what we observe, not only would human life be unable to exist, but there would be no life to observe the universe.Worded formally, this is known as the "weak" anthropic argument, distinguishing it from the "strong" argument (also later developed by Carter). The latter is "strong" in that asserts a much bolder (but simplified) position - the Universe had to bring humanity into being.
To better understand the gist of these arguments (for interests of time I will not delve into the minute differences of weak and strong principles), think about other planets in our solar system. Beyond speculations of Kepler exoplanets, the planets were know of are completely uninhabitable. Temperatures are too extreme for anything to survive - the planets are vast wastelands. If any of these planets represented the entire universe instead, the universe would essentially be a wasteland as well. No human or animal would be around to acknowledge this. The universe itself, then, may as well be non-existent. The fact that we are here to know all this says something about WHY.
The strong argument is so bold as to be controversial by any look, and thus it will not be addressed here. Our focus will be on the weak anthropic principle. This will prove difficult, as the argument was derived by someone with no intention of evaluating the universe's origins. As we saw with the teleological argument, however, a universe as ordered and structured as ours must have some similarly ordered (purposeful) cause. In our case, this would be God. As with other arguments we've evaluated, random chance is the only alternative, as it merely appears to have order, but in fact is chaotic and senseless.
With that said, a traditional objection to acknowledging an intelligent designer behind the earth's fine-tuning would look like this:
This is why scientists sometimes embrace the anthropic principle - to them it confirms why our universe is observable, but other possible universes (which increase the "chance" of our universe's occurence) are not. In response, however, this clearly is rooted in more physical evidence than it would be said I have for God's existence. I also offer this - could God not have created a multiverse? (not that I necessarily believe this)? Also, supposing it exists, why should the multiverse even allow the creation of intelligent life? [2] We assume intelligent life is needed for observation, but why should it exist amongst the supposed array of chaotic, random, lifeless universes?
If intelligent life is not really needed in a multiverse, then we can say the existence of intelligent life perhaps begs for a "purposeful" cause - God. Inn some ways, the abstract concept of the "multiverse" is little different from arguing "God did it". It makes sense of things without itself being a visible, physical reality. But let's be clear - both cases avoid evidence, yet only in 1 explanation makes sense of why life should even be expected to exist. In a time when Christians (and any believer in God) are said to ignore science or evidence, or hold belief without evidence (a topic I will explore following this series) - this is worth pointing out. The odds are stacked against "random chance", no matter how many universes might exist or might make the explanation more likely.
On the other end of hypotheticals for the anthropic principle, there are numerous proofs in the way of logic, probability and Bayesian formulas. These are hotly debated, and not in my area of expertise so I will skip this aspect of the debate. I trust what I cover here is sufficient to help one make up their mind. Much like the cosmological argument, though, how one defines their terms will always be a subject of debate. Criticism in this area only helps us refine and clarify our position. Offering it as an "end all" proof is questionable.
Moving away from the hypothetical, let's get more into reality. I want to look at just a handful of evidences, or "constants" in our universe's operation, that indicate it may be "finely-tuned" for intelligent life.[3] These are, after all, the amazing observations that triggered awe for the scientists developing the anthropic argument.
To look at this another way, scientists use this analogy: suppose you are tied to a post and facing a firing squad. Everyone in the squad aims their gun and fires. To your surprise, after hearing the gunshots go off and seeing smoke rise, you find you are still alive. You have survived. The reasoning above - that we are here simply because the universe developed the way it did - is the same as saying "Of course I survived the shooting. Everyone else missed their shot!" True as this is, it does nothing to answer the more obvious question - why did everyone miss? If even 1 person had hit, things would have ended very different for you - you would not have survived. Speculation about what kind of person could have survived the gunshot is much less relevant.
Let's take a closer look at this thinking. First, given that all forms of life we know are carbon-based, I would question why we should expect life to exist in another form. Going back to the Big Bang, proponents of the anthropic principle point out if anything happened differently during this crucial event, the universe may have been too unstable for anything to exist. So why speculate about other types of lifeforms that may have developed differently? We may be lucky to be here (or privileged, if you believe God has put us here) - but someone needs to prove it is reasonable to expect other life to exist AT ALL. And, even if that were shown, that fails to rule out God as a creator. It merely means he would have had to create us with a very different composition. Whether or not the universe is efficient without His involvement is of little consequence to whether or not it was put in place by Him to start with. This expresses the importance of differentiating between efficient causes and final causes. Showing that the universe is efficient, regardless of how it is done, does not address whether or not it had a final, purposed cause.
The last objection I've seen to the anthropic principle is a more recent one in the news. It is often said if the universe is so "fine-tuned for life, then Einstein's cosmological constant (which is a determination of how fast or slow the universe is expanding) would be expected to have a value that maximizes the creation of life. But as recent research from Canada reveals, the actual value in our universe is slightly positive. According to Don Page, this means it "dilutes matter and prevents a lot of gravitational collapse making our universe less likely for life than if the constant were not positive" [4].
Unfortunately, like assuming God does not create chaos, this argument assumes God must create a universe with the absolute best possible cosmological constant for life. To do otherwise, I suppose the thinking goes, would make him less benevolent or "pro-life". This means that God must fit the scientist's tightly constrained box in order to be plausible whatsoever. But that merely begs questions. First, is God really less "good" because our universe is not as efficient as it should be? What if being "good" or "perfect" involves balancing chaos with purpose, rather than eliminating it all together? (this is intimately related to the infamous "problem of evil"). Second, as creationists might point out, we assume the constant has, in fact, remained constant. But what if our universe is not efficient now because a change was introduced at some point in the (unobservable) past? For instance, God's curse on creation after Adam/Eve's disobedience?
Ultimately, the anthropic argument is one that will always be interpreted based on what you assume to be true about the universe's origins. It can not point someone specifically to God, as it is more a compliment to the teleological argument and subject to similar limitations. But it can remind those of us who believe in God that this world is not one of many random universes or worlds. And it can remind those who do not believe in God that we have many reasons to be thankful for our lives everyday. Whether or not you believe the universe is cooling, expanding, heating up, dying out or being renewed - it is a masterful work of art that functions efficiently. One particular anthropic constant may be co-incidence, but dozens of them being just right for anything in this universe to remain stable - that begs for acknowledging something greater than ourselves. If you think that random chance really makes more sense than intelligent design and purpose, I would hate to see how unpredictable your outlook on life must be.
[1] What Is the Anthropic Principle?" WiseGEEK: Clear Answers for Common Questions. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-anthropic-principle.htm>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle
[2] Castellano, Daniel J. "A Critique of the Anthropic Principle." Repository of Arcane Knowledge - Home. 2006. Web. 25 Jan. 2012. <http://www.arcaneknowledge.org/science/anthropic.htm>.
[3] Barrow, John D., and Frank J. Tipler. The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. Oxford [Oxfordshire: Oxford UP, 1986. Print.
[4] Page, Don. "Evidence Against The Universe Being Fine Tuned For Life." The Eternal Universe. Web. 27 Jan. 2012. <http://www.theeternaluniverse.com/2011/01/evidence-against-universe-being-fine.html>.
Anthropic means 'having to do with human beings' (intelligent life) - so the anthropic argument is speculating about the universe's setup for human life. First introduced to the scientific community by Brandon Carter in 1973 [1], the anthropic argument was intended to clarify the work of Copernicus (who believed mankind was not in a "privileged" position in the universe). Carter believed that although mankind may not be in the center of the universe, it was impossible for us to be in the universe if we were unable to witness it. In essence, the universe could not be "observed" if not made to include observers. If it was created in any way that deviates from what we observe, not only would human life be unable to exist, but there would be no life to observe the universe.Worded formally, this is known as the "weak" anthropic argument, distinguishing it from the "strong" argument (also later developed by Carter). The latter is "strong" in that asserts a much bolder (but simplified) position - the Universe had to bring humanity into being.
To better understand the gist of these arguments (for interests of time I will not delve into the minute differences of weak and strong principles), think about other planets in our solar system. Beyond speculations of Kepler exoplanets, the planets were know of are completely uninhabitable. Temperatures are too extreme for anything to survive - the planets are vast wastelands. If any of these planets represented the entire universe instead, the universe would essentially be a wasteland as well. No human or animal would be around to acknowledge this. The universe itself, then, may as well be non-existent. The fact that we are here to know all this says something about WHY.
The strong argument is so bold as to be controversial by any look, and thus it will not be addressed here. Our focus will be on the weak anthropic principle. This will prove difficult, as the argument was derived by someone with no intention of evaluating the universe's origins. As we saw with the teleological argument, however, a universe as ordered and structured as ours must have some similarly ordered (purposeful) cause. In our case, this would be God. As with other arguments we've evaluated, random chance is the only alternative, as it merely appears to have order, but in fact is chaotic and senseless.
With that said, a traditional objection to acknowledging an intelligent designer behind the earth's fine-tuning would look like this:
Only a universe containing intelligent life will have observers, so there is nothing special about our universe. It is necessary for it to be finely tuned. If enough universes exist without intelligent life, it is only by chance ours is the only one we are aware of and able to observe.In short, if a large enough number of universes could exist, it is no surprise one would, by chance, be produced with all the right constants for life. This objection eludes to the so-called "multiverse" (existence of multiple universes) needed for it to be a valid argument. This "multiverse" - a virtual hypothetical in physics - exists only by convention. It is the only way to explain how the improbable odds of "random chance" creating the order we see, could be possible. If there are enough universes, the odds are better.
This is why scientists sometimes embrace the anthropic principle - to them it confirms why our universe is observable, but other possible universes (which increase the "chance" of our universe's occurence) are not. In response, however, this clearly is rooted in more physical evidence than it would be said I have for God's existence. I also offer this - could God not have created a multiverse? (not that I necessarily believe this)? Also, supposing it exists, why should the multiverse even allow the creation of intelligent life? [2] We assume intelligent life is needed for observation, but why should it exist amongst the supposed array of chaotic, random, lifeless universes?
If intelligent life is not really needed in a multiverse, then we can say the existence of intelligent life perhaps begs for a "purposeful" cause - God. Inn some ways, the abstract concept of the "multiverse" is little different from arguing "God did it". It makes sense of things without itself being a visible, physical reality. But let's be clear - both cases avoid evidence, yet only in 1 explanation makes sense of why life should even be expected to exist. In a time when Christians (and any believer in God) are said to ignore science or evidence, or hold belief without evidence (a topic I will explore following this series) - this is worth pointing out. The odds are stacked against "random chance", no matter how many universes might exist or might make the explanation more likely.
On the other end of hypotheticals for the anthropic principle, there are numerous proofs in the way of logic, probability and Bayesian formulas. These are hotly debated, and not in my area of expertise so I will skip this aspect of the debate. I trust what I cover here is sufficient to help one make up their mind. Much like the cosmological argument, though, how one defines their terms will always be a subject of debate. Criticism in this area only helps us refine and clarify our position. Offering it as an "end all" proof is questionable.
Moving away from the hypothetical, let's get more into reality. I want to look at just a handful of evidences, or "constants" in our universe's operation, that indicate it may be "finely-tuned" for intelligent life.[3] These are, after all, the amazing observations that triggered awe for the scientists developing the anthropic argument.
- If surface gravity was stronger, the planet’s atmosphere would retain huge amounts of ammonia and methane. If it were any weaker, the atmosphere would lose too much water
- The 23-degree axis tilt, if it were altered slightly, would cause temperatures on Earth to be too extreme
- If there were more less seismic activity (earthquakes), nutrients on the ocean floors and in river runoff would not be cycled back to the continents through tectonic uplift.
- If we were too far from our parent star (the sun), we would be too cool for a stable water cycle. If we were too close, it would be too warm.
- If the "weak nuclear force" were slightly stronger, the universe would consist completely of hydrogen. If it was any weaker, the universe would be 100% helium.
- If Jupiter was not in its current orbit, we would be bombarded with space material. Jupiter’s
gravitational field acts as a cosmic vacuum cleaner, attracting asteroids and comets that would
otherwise strike earth.
To look at this another way, scientists use this analogy: suppose you are tied to a post and facing a firing squad. Everyone in the squad aims their gun and fires. To your surprise, after hearing the gunshots go off and seeing smoke rise, you find you are still alive. You have survived. The reasoning above - that we are here simply because the universe developed the way it did - is the same as saying "Of course I survived the shooting. Everyone else missed their shot!" True as this is, it does nothing to answer the more obvious question - why did everyone miss? If even 1 person had hit, things would have ended very different for you - you would not have survived. Speculation about what kind of person could have survived the gunshot is much less relevant.
Let's take a closer look at this thinking. First, given that all forms of life we know are carbon-based, I would question why we should expect life to exist in another form. Going back to the Big Bang, proponents of the anthropic principle point out if anything happened differently during this crucial event, the universe may have been too unstable for anything to exist. So why speculate about other types of lifeforms that may have developed differently? We may be lucky to be here (or privileged, if you believe God has put us here) - but someone needs to prove it is reasonable to expect other life to exist AT ALL. And, even if that were shown, that fails to rule out God as a creator. It merely means he would have had to create us with a very different composition. Whether or not the universe is efficient without His involvement is of little consequence to whether or not it was put in place by Him to start with. This expresses the importance of differentiating between efficient causes and final causes. Showing that the universe is efficient, regardless of how it is done, does not address whether or not it had a final, purposed cause.
The last objection I've seen to the anthropic principle is a more recent one in the news. It is often said if the universe is so "fine-tuned for life, then Einstein's cosmological constant (which is a determination of how fast or slow the universe is expanding) would be expected to have a value that maximizes the creation of life. But as recent research from Canada reveals, the actual value in our universe is slightly positive. According to Don Page, this means it "dilutes matter and prevents a lot of gravitational collapse making our universe less likely for life than if the constant were not positive" [4].
Unfortunately, like assuming God does not create chaos, this argument assumes God must create a universe with the absolute best possible cosmological constant for life. To do otherwise, I suppose the thinking goes, would make him less benevolent or "pro-life". This means that God must fit the scientist's tightly constrained box in order to be plausible whatsoever. But that merely begs questions. First, is God really less "good" because our universe is not as efficient as it should be? What if being "good" or "perfect" involves balancing chaos with purpose, rather than eliminating it all together? (this is intimately related to the infamous "problem of evil"). Second, as creationists might point out, we assume the constant has, in fact, remained constant. But what if our universe is not efficient now because a change was introduced at some point in the (unobservable) past? For instance, God's curse on creation after Adam/Eve's disobedience?
Ultimately, the anthropic argument is one that will always be interpreted based on what you assume to be true about the universe's origins. It can not point someone specifically to God, as it is more a compliment to the teleological argument and subject to similar limitations. But it can remind those of us who believe in God that this world is not one of many random universes or worlds. And it can remind those who do not believe in God that we have many reasons to be thankful for our lives everyday. Whether or not you believe the universe is cooling, expanding, heating up, dying out or being renewed - it is a masterful work of art that functions efficiently. One particular anthropic constant may be co-incidence, but dozens of them being just right for anything in this universe to remain stable - that begs for acknowledging something greater than ourselves. If you think that random chance really makes more sense than intelligent design and purpose, I would hate to see how unpredictable your outlook on life must be.
[1] What Is the Anthropic Principle?" WiseGEEK: Clear Answers for Common Questions. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-the-anthropic-principle.htm>
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropic_principle
[2] Castellano, Daniel J. "A Critique of the Anthropic Principle." Repository of Arcane Knowledge - Home. 2006. Web. 25 Jan. 2012. <http://www.arcaneknowledge.org/science/anthropic.htm>.
[3] Barrow, John D., and Frank J. Tipler. The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. Oxford [Oxfordshire: Oxford UP, 1986. Print.
[4] Page, Don. "Evidence Against The Universe Being Fine Tuned For Life." The Eternal Universe. Web. 27 Jan. 2012. <http://www.theeternaluniverse.com/2011/01/evidence-against-universe-being-fine.html>.
Tuesday, January 17, 2012
God's Existence, Part 5 - Greatest Good
This time we will be looking at what is known as the ontological argument for God. Ontology is a study of the nature of existence. Therefore, the ontological argument would be something like this: if I can conceive of a being whose nature is greater than anything else in the universe, then it must exist. Behind this logic is a chain of reason that goes like this: since humans can still understand things we do not see, there is still reason to believe they exist.
The origin of this argument only dates back to the 11th century, when St. Anselm of Canterbury first proposed the most popular form of it. [1] However, it was not then used as proof of God's existence. Anselm instead was sharing it as part of his mental reflections on God (much like I do here). He already assumed God's existence. It would be the popular mathematician, Rene Descartes (inventor of the "cartesian" x/y coordinate system for graphing mathematical equations) who would first use the argument in favor of God's existence. [2] He put God's existence on par with other mental abstracts such as numbers and shapes. Just as geometry can be inferred from the existence of shapes, or math from the existence of numbers, God can be deduced from the fact that we can conceive of Him. Furthermore, he clarified that if "existence" is perfect or desirable as an attribute, and God is the complete perfection of all attributes, then God must have the "attribute" of existence.
Somewhat later, German philosopher Leibniz, agreeing with Descartes, saw the need to further clarify that in order for God to be conceivable (naturally "understood"), his attributes must be coherent (understandable). [3] In other words, God must have omniscience (all-knowledge), omnipresence (present everywhere) and omnipotence (complete power), or else he can not naturally be a "most supreme" being. This opened a new area of evaluation for the argument, which more modern philosophers like Kurt Godel and Alvin Plantinga would included as part of their more formal, logical versions of the ontological argument. [4] With this clarification, the argument is at it's strongest and most logical.
It also at this point that criticism becomes most important to address. If it can be shown that God can not possibly hold all 3 of these attributes - if He does not have complete power, or does not know everything - it could be disputed that such a "most supreme" being exists. And, in general, skeptics believe this is where traditional views of God fail. For example, are omniscience and omnipotence compatible? If God is powerful enough to create beings with free will (who can make their own decisions), then how can he know everything they will decide? Or, can God be both perfectly just (giving everyone what they deserve) and perfectly merciful (giving people less than they deserve)? Kenneth Himma sees these objections as the death blow to the ontological argument. [5]
This is why I've stressed so many times we need to be careful how we define the "God" (or "designer", or "first cause") that we propose belief in, and how we understand the words we use. In doing so, we can knock down the traditional walls that stand in the way of belief. Some people I have spoken with very much would agree with the skeptics above, that God as traditionally explained does not seem very logical. And I must concede, they are right. But if we can define God to unbelievers in a way that is logical, we might be able to help knock down more walls in the battle for minds.
Regarding mercy and justice, the problem is that mercy, as defined (someone receiving less than they deserve), has only more recently taken on this meaning, and only then in certain societies (those oriented towards individualism). The origins of the word mercy - the Latin merces - literally mean "price paid", and referred to a reward owed someone for good behavior. [6] So in the world of most philosophers, and most people who have lived, to have mercy meant you paid a personal (not monetary) debt (price) to someone who earned it! [7] Applied to God, this means he does favors for people who deserve them - he rewards them as they are due. (a very simple example would be answering prayers) In this sense, mercy actually compliments justice (giving people what they deserve), and the 2 concepts are not in any contradiction!
Moving on to the objections about free will and omniscience (without getting into the details of the argument), Himma is misguided. If God knows we will do something, are we really not "free" to do it? This can only be said to be true if God has determined what will happen as a result. But why must this be so? What if free will simply means we can make decisions without being forced into them? Can't we determine our outcomes independent of God's knowledge of them? If this is not a comfortable thought, perhaps the alternative offered by CS Lewis is. If we perceive God as being outside time-space, He does not need to know what will happen before it happens. Instead, he can see all events taking place at once - past, present and future.[8] This way he remains omniscient regardless of what choices are made about the future. Only humans are restricted to time-space, acting randomly within their own perception of time but not outside God's. The only way free will interferes with omniscience is when we narrowly define "free will".
As opposed to the teleological argument, which I said was post priori (after-the-fact), you can see the ontological argument so far has nothing to do with facts whatsoever. It completely relies on evaluating if/then scenarios. This makes it a classic example of what is an a priori argument (before-the-fact). It is an exercise of logic that does not speculate about the nature of the universe. It focuses instead on the plausibility of the belief. This, of course, is also what proves to be the source of most criticism of the argument. How can something be proven to exist if no observation is available?
The first was Hume's primary objection, as you should come to expect from anything he evalutes. It is also the same type of objection Immanuel Kant, an 18th century German philosopher, would raise. [9] He saw the argument as more of a "truth" than reality because it relies on if/then logic. If shapes exist, it is true they must conform to certain properties. If God exists, then it is true he must have the "perfect attributes" ascribed to him. In each case I must accept the premises to for the argument to hold. To know, in reality, whether or not God exists is a separate matter that requires concrete or testable "experience".
As I mentioned in previous posts, this thinking at best rejects abstract realms of perception from the outset. For instance, what about the existence of a spiritual realm? "It must not be there since we can not observe it", Hume would say. But isn't that presumptuous? If it is an abstract concept, shouldn't abstract proofs be enough? Why should only physical evidence be valid criteria? After all, the whole realm of mathematics is a beautiful mix of abstract concepts and concrete rules working together to explain the universe. Hume-an rational like this only begs questions and shows a narrow approach to the realms of information and knowledge.
Whether or not the argument represents reality, in a true sense it is one that comes almost completely from imagination. The fact that it centers around what we can "conceive" has proven to be a source of criticism even from other believers! Gaunilo, a Benedictine monk from Anselm's time, pointed out that this type reasoning could be used to prove that just about anything must exist. For instance, if I can conceive of the "perfect island", I can use the same logic to show that it too must exist. Thomas Aquinas rejected the idea that God can even be fully knowable, so he cannot be "conceived" of in the way Anselm suggests. [10]
However, since God's "attributes" were shown earlier to be coherent, we are not proving "anything" we can imagine, as Gaunilo objected. We are proving a specific definition of God and his qualities - all-powerful, all-knowing and ever-present. Regarding Aquinas' objection, this would be the rallying cry of much of the emergent church movement. But it is merely a challenge to whether or not God would want to be knowable, perceiving Him as less infinite or majestic if he is. He is still taken to be an existent being, whether or not you agree being "knowable" is an attribute he would have.
In the end, as I have said before, it is tough to agree that offering criticisms for an argument make the argument useless. The criticisms offered for each of the arguments we've looked at so far merely inform us of the argument's limits and help us redefine it. To reject ontology on grounds related to concrete evidence, when it still supports God as an abstract concept, is misguided. Taken with other arguments (cosmology, teleology) that offer concrete evidence, the ontological argument gives us part of the bigger picture of God. It shows God's existence through His perfection - standing in opposition to some natural force or "Big Bang". The existence of such things, if proven, are ultimately more convenient than "perfect".
[1] "Ontological Argument." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument>.
[2] ibid
[3] ibid
[4] ibid
[5] "Ontological Argument for the Existence of God [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/>.
[6] "Definition of Mercy - Merriam-Webster's Student Dictionary." Merriam-Webster's Word Central. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.wordcentral.com/cgi-bin/student?mercy>.
[7] Pilch, John J., and Bruce J. Malina. Handbook of Biblical Social Values. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1998. 93. Print.
[8] C. S. Lewis Mere Christianity Touchstone:New York, 1980 p.149
[9] "Ontological Argument." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument>.
[10] ibid
The origin of this argument only dates back to the 11th century, when St. Anselm of Canterbury first proposed the most popular form of it. [1] However, it was not then used as proof of God's existence. Anselm instead was sharing it as part of his mental reflections on God (much like I do here). He already assumed God's existence. It would be the popular mathematician, Rene Descartes (inventor of the "cartesian" x/y coordinate system for graphing mathematical equations) who would first use the argument in favor of God's existence. [2] He put God's existence on par with other mental abstracts such as numbers and shapes. Just as geometry can be inferred from the existence of shapes, or math from the existence of numbers, God can be deduced from the fact that we can conceive of Him. Furthermore, he clarified that if "existence" is perfect or desirable as an attribute, and God is the complete perfection of all attributes, then God must have the "attribute" of existence.
Somewhat later, German philosopher Leibniz, agreeing with Descartes, saw the need to further clarify that in order for God to be conceivable (naturally "understood"), his attributes must be coherent (understandable). [3] In other words, God must have omniscience (all-knowledge), omnipresence (present everywhere) and omnipotence (complete power), or else he can not naturally be a "most supreme" being. This opened a new area of evaluation for the argument, which more modern philosophers like Kurt Godel and Alvin Plantinga would included as part of their more formal, logical versions of the ontological argument. [4] With this clarification, the argument is at it's strongest and most logical.
It also at this point that criticism becomes most important to address. If it can be shown that God can not possibly hold all 3 of these attributes - if He does not have complete power, or does not know everything - it could be disputed that such a "most supreme" being exists. And, in general, skeptics believe this is where traditional views of God fail. For example, are omniscience and omnipotence compatible? If God is powerful enough to create beings with free will (who can make their own decisions), then how can he know everything they will decide? Or, can God be both perfectly just (giving everyone what they deserve) and perfectly merciful (giving people less than they deserve)? Kenneth Himma sees these objections as the death blow to the ontological argument. [5]
This is why I've stressed so many times we need to be careful how we define the "God" (or "designer", or "first cause") that we propose belief in, and how we understand the words we use. In doing so, we can knock down the traditional walls that stand in the way of belief. Some people I have spoken with very much would agree with the skeptics above, that God as traditionally explained does not seem very logical. And I must concede, they are right. But if we can define God to unbelievers in a way that is logical, we might be able to help knock down more walls in the battle for minds.
So how do we respond to these arguments?
Moving on to the objections about free will and omniscience (without getting into the details of the argument), Himma is misguided. If God knows we will do something, are we really not "free" to do it? This can only be said to be true if God has determined what will happen as a result. But why must this be so? What if free will simply means we can make decisions without being forced into them? Can't we determine our outcomes independent of God's knowledge of them? If this is not a comfortable thought, perhaps the alternative offered by CS Lewis is. If we perceive God as being outside time-space, He does not need to know what will happen before it happens. Instead, he can see all events taking place at once - past, present and future.[8] This way he remains omniscient regardless of what choices are made about the future. Only humans are restricted to time-space, acting randomly within their own perception of time but not outside God's. The only way free will interferes with omniscience is when we narrowly define "free will".
As opposed to the teleological argument, which I said was post priori (after-the-fact), you can see the ontological argument so far has nothing to do with facts whatsoever. It completely relies on evaluating if/then scenarios. This makes it a classic example of what is an a priori argument (before-the-fact). It is an exercise of logic that does not speculate about the nature of the universe. It focuses instead on the plausibility of the belief. This, of course, is also what proves to be the source of most criticism of the argument. How can something be proven to exist if no observation is available?
The first was Hume's primary objection, as you should come to expect from anything he evalutes. It is also the same type of objection Immanuel Kant, an 18th century German philosopher, would raise. [9] He saw the argument as more of a "truth" than reality because it relies on if/then logic. If shapes exist, it is true they must conform to certain properties. If God exists, then it is true he must have the "perfect attributes" ascribed to him. In each case I must accept the premises to for the argument to hold. To know, in reality, whether or not God exists is a separate matter that requires concrete or testable "experience".
As I mentioned in previous posts, this thinking at best rejects abstract realms of perception from the outset. For instance, what about the existence of a spiritual realm? "It must not be there since we can not observe it", Hume would say. But isn't that presumptuous? If it is an abstract concept, shouldn't abstract proofs be enough? Why should only physical evidence be valid criteria? After all, the whole realm of mathematics is a beautiful mix of abstract concepts and concrete rules working together to explain the universe. Hume-an rational like this only begs questions and shows a narrow approach to the realms of information and knowledge.
Whether or not the argument represents reality, in a true sense it is one that comes almost completely from imagination. The fact that it centers around what we can "conceive" has proven to be a source of criticism even from other believers! Gaunilo, a Benedictine monk from Anselm's time, pointed out that this type reasoning could be used to prove that just about anything must exist. For instance, if I can conceive of the "perfect island", I can use the same logic to show that it too must exist. Thomas Aquinas rejected the idea that God can even be fully knowable, so he cannot be "conceived" of in the way Anselm suggests. [10]
However, since God's "attributes" were shown earlier to be coherent, we are not proving "anything" we can imagine, as Gaunilo objected. We are proving a specific definition of God and his qualities - all-powerful, all-knowing and ever-present. Regarding Aquinas' objection, this would be the rallying cry of much of the emergent church movement. But it is merely a challenge to whether or not God would want to be knowable, perceiving Him as less infinite or majestic if he is. He is still taken to be an existent being, whether or not you agree being "knowable" is an attribute he would have.
In the end, as I have said before, it is tough to agree that offering criticisms for an argument make the argument useless. The criticisms offered for each of the arguments we've looked at so far merely inform us of the argument's limits and help us redefine it. To reject ontology on grounds related to concrete evidence, when it still supports God as an abstract concept, is misguided. Taken with other arguments (cosmology, teleology) that offer concrete evidence, the ontological argument gives us part of the bigger picture of God. It shows God's existence through His perfection - standing in opposition to some natural force or "Big Bang". The existence of such things, if proven, are ultimately more convenient than "perfect".
[1] "Ontological Argument." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument>.
[2] ibid
[3] ibid
[4] ibid
[5] "Ontological Argument for the Existence of God [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/>.
[6] "Definition of Mercy - Merriam-Webster's Student Dictionary." Merriam-Webster's Word Central. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.wordcentral.com/cgi-bin/student?mercy>.
[7] Pilch, John J., and Bruce J. Malina. Handbook of Biblical Social Values. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1998. 93. Print.
[8] C. S. Lewis Mere Christianity Touchstone:New York, 1980 p.149
[9] "Ontological Argument." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument>.
[10] ibid
Wednesday, January 11, 2012
God's Existence, Part 4 - Final Cause
Moving on in our discussion of philosophical proofs for God, I will now take a look at what is likely the 2nd most popular argument for the existence of God. It is called the teleological argument, or argument from design (purpose), as teleology is the study of "final" causes (purpose). Because the argument is based on what we observe and know (complexity in nature), it is also what philosophers call an a posteriori (after the fact) argument.
The argument is rooted in the phenomena that things in nature appear to have a specific, guided purpose or design. The universe, and all of nature, always behaves the same way, predictably and perfectly, as if designed. Because human thought is also aimed towards purpose this way, a similar (but superior) intelligence must be behind the order and existence of nature. This intelligence, of course, is what we call God. The alternative explanation is that such complexity is the product of chaos or random causes - but that eliminates any "purpose" or guidance. Not to mention, the odds of such happening (order coming from random chance) are so highly improbable as to be unlikely.
For Christians, this is an easy argument to understand. Humanity was created in God's image (Genesis 1:27), and scholars frequently point out this means they reflect God's abstract (not physical) qualities - thought, emotion, authority, etc. So, just as we perceive and design complex structures ourselves, God is able to do so on an infinitely greater scale, and has done so with the universe. This makes sense of what we see in nature above our ability to comprehend. That the universe itself operates on fine-tuned and reliable laws practically begs for attention to be given towards an ultimate designer.
The origins of this argument, as with many, trace back to classical Greek philosophers. For instance, Plato, Aristotle and Socrates are some of the earliest known minds to develop teleological arguments. Because the concept seems so "natural", however, many minds have contributed to the argument over time. For this reason, and because there are so many variations, I will not go into much history. Some of the more notable contributors, however, include Augustine, Thomas Aquinas (a name that will feature in most philosophical debates) and William Paley (creator of the famous "watchmaker" analogy - that if I see a watch and know nothing about watches, I would be inclined to conclude it did not assemble itself).
To evaluate the argument closer, let's look at 1 generic formulation of the argument, which should give us a platform from which to discuss details and weaknesses.
So how are we to respond to these challenges? What validity do they have? First, since Hume's time many scientists and skeptics, whether fans of design arguments or not, have agreed that an abundance of things in nature clearly have the appearance of having been designed. It is only through their intention to explain things apart from design that such individuals reject design arguments. Anyway, the original argument is not entirely clear - in what ways do definitions of a living being contradict characteristics for a machine? Why should they be mutually exclusive, except that "living beings" are not the immediate product of humans. But isn't the design argument aimed at showing the same "designer" was responsible for purpose in each? (both human and animal)
On the 2nd point, just because there could be different causes for similar effects does not make it likely or assured. Empirical evidence must be introduced to show conclusively that 2 things appearing similar in nature are caused by different genetics (that will never happen) or different sources. Even evolution does not posit such things, but holds to common ancestry as the source of common traits.
The next argument is perhaps the weakest. It fits hand-in-glove with declarations that philosophical arguments cannot confirm a specific God. This is true, but is that relevant? If you can prove that common (or traditional) views of God are false, does that mean there cannot exist a view of God that still conforms to what we see in nature? Also, what if our common ways of understanding God are flawed? Indeed, it has been my experience that this is the case when skeptics cry about something disproving God as "good" or "perfect".
Allow me to elaborate - when it is said that certain things in nature show God cannot be good, skeptical literature often points to one of 2 things:
1) because some things in nature appear to have flawed design, God appears to be a poor designer.
2) if evil exists in the world, then God cannot be good
We might deal more with #2 in future posts, but answering both arguments is similar. What if appearances are not what they seem? What if something interfered with God's design? What if the things we see in nature now do not reflect original design given at creation? Say, for instance, something happened along the course of history that introduced problems? For example, God proclaims a curse on his heretofore "perfect" creation and mankind is suddenly needed to care for it? (Genesis 3:17-19) What if there was a worldwide flood that permanently altered biochemistry and geology in ways unpredictable by standard models? (Genesis 7:11-24)
Or what if some things were designed to ultimately adapt and change to various environments? What if "chaos" itself was even part of God's design? (not a popular argument, or even necessarily sound, but one with some good linguistic evidence) Do any of these things then point a bad finger to God, or to our narrow attempts to understand his ways of operation? Do these truly prove, beyond doubt, that God is not good? Or do they merely prove that God allowed a certain level of chaos to enter the world, which is responsible for the universe's flaws?
Hume's arguments against teleology are not the only challenges, of course. Other challenges face the argument, and we must look at them as well. The first is that if nature itself (or the universe) is naturally complex, it would indeed suffice as the "intelligent" designer, and that no outside force would be needed. Or, if we grant that God is the designer, he must be much more complex than his creation, and for that to be so is just as improbable as random chance giving way to purpose. The problem with the first view is it does no better job of avoiding a regress than positing God as a designer. It also begs the question - why is the universe that complex? The problem with the 2nd view is it fails to accept the notion of God as being uncreated and uncaused, and therefore not subject to the laws that apply to the created universe(as we saw in the cosmological argument).
There is also debate over what it means to say the design argument is the "best" explanation for the evidence. How is it determined that certain features must be designed? It is difficult to do so without being subjective, so this line of questioning is best left untouched. Our per-commited bias in evaluating such information will always force us to choose or reject explanations based on our views own views. I have seen atheists refuse to accept supernatural explanations for anything (virgin birth) merely on the basis that such explanations are not testable. And as we looked at in our first post on this subject, this is stacking the deck, and such a complaint can just as easily be thrown at a creationist who would refuse to accept that natural processes could have caused something (when at issue is whether or not natural processes would have caused everything).
Finally, what about alternative explanations to design? Frankly, providing alternatives does not suffice to undermine an argument. At best, it only calls into question the premises of the argument, which can simply be adapted to reach the same conclusion (much as William Lane Craig has done withthe Kalam Cosmological Argument). Even if an alternative explanation is accepted, such as random chance or multiple universes, it does nothing to prove God could not be behind such a process (whether or not you personally believe he is). It just shows that he is not needed for the explanation, and that moves the issue within the scope of the cosmological argument. This is why I have tried to say we should never take just 1 argument as complete proof for our case.
In the end, the teleology argument remains a strong one, and I have not even dived into "fine-tuning" aspects of the debate (the fact that conditions needed for the universe to operate as it does can be calculated to have an impossibly high chance of being the result of random processes). Much like the cosmological argument, it cannot identify a specific entity as the designer. In fact, as shown, some proponents appeal to natural explanations as the designer (including Darwinian evolution). But design ultimately makes a case for the necessity of some such high-order force at work. Just as with the cosmological argument, I believe when we carefully define the intelligent being without speculation (ie, random chance could have caused it), we have something to test for fitness to the evidence. In turn, we can narrow down identities for the designer and reveal the problem with arguments like #3 from Hume's list (which show up often in philosophical debates). This, of course, means we have to put natural explanations to test as well, and in the future I hope to do just that (if I determine how to best organize such a presentation).
Some sources used to stoke my thought processes are as follows:
The argument is rooted in the phenomena that things in nature appear to have a specific, guided purpose or design. The universe, and all of nature, always behaves the same way, predictably and perfectly, as if designed. Because human thought is also aimed towards purpose this way, a similar (but superior) intelligence must be behind the order and existence of nature. This intelligence, of course, is what we call God. The alternative explanation is that such complexity is the product of chaos or random causes - but that eliminates any "purpose" or guidance. Not to mention, the odds of such happening (order coming from random chance) are so highly improbable as to be unlikely.
For Christians, this is an easy argument to understand. Humanity was created in God's image (Genesis 1:27), and scholars frequently point out this means they reflect God's abstract (not physical) qualities - thought, emotion, authority, etc. So, just as we perceive and design complex structures ourselves, God is able to do so on an infinitely greater scale, and has done so with the universe. This makes sense of what we see in nature above our ability to comprehend. That the universe itself operates on fine-tuned and reliable laws practically begs for attention to be given towards an ultimate designer.
The origins of this argument, as with many, trace back to classical Greek philosophers. For instance, Plato, Aristotle and Socrates are some of the earliest known minds to develop teleological arguments. Because the concept seems so "natural", however, many minds have contributed to the argument over time. For this reason, and because there are so many variations, I will not go into much history. Some of the more notable contributors, however, include Augustine, Thomas Aquinas (a name that will feature in most philosophical debates) and William Paley (creator of the famous "watchmaker" analogy - that if I see a watch and know nothing about watches, I would be inclined to conclude it did not assemble itself).
To evaluate the argument closer, let's look at 1 generic formulation of the argument, which should give us a platform from which to discuss details and weaknesses.
- An object in nature (or nature itself) is like a product designed by human intelligence (a machine) because it has specific complex qualities
- This product (machine) has complex qualities because it is a product of human intelligence
- Similar effects often have similar causes (or explanations)
- So it is likely that this object in nature has the same qualities because it is also a product of similar intelligence.
- Most of nature is not similar to human products (machines) but to living beings.
- Similar affects could have different causes
- Even if an intelligence could be suggested, some flawed elements of nature would make that intelligence appear different from the traditional view of God (perfect and benevolent)
So how are we to respond to these challenges? What validity do they have? First, since Hume's time many scientists and skeptics, whether fans of design arguments or not, have agreed that an abundance of things in nature clearly have the appearance of having been designed. It is only through their intention to explain things apart from design that such individuals reject design arguments. Anyway, the original argument is not entirely clear - in what ways do definitions of a living being contradict characteristics for a machine? Why should they be mutually exclusive, except that "living beings" are not the immediate product of humans. But isn't the design argument aimed at showing the same "designer" was responsible for purpose in each? (both human and animal)
On the 2nd point, just because there could be different causes for similar effects does not make it likely or assured. Empirical evidence must be introduced to show conclusively that 2 things appearing similar in nature are caused by different genetics (that will never happen) or different sources. Even evolution does not posit such things, but holds to common ancestry as the source of common traits.
The next argument is perhaps the weakest. It fits hand-in-glove with declarations that philosophical arguments cannot confirm a specific God. This is true, but is that relevant? If you can prove that common (or traditional) views of God are false, does that mean there cannot exist a view of God that still conforms to what we see in nature? Also, what if our common ways of understanding God are flawed? Indeed, it has been my experience that this is the case when skeptics cry about something disproving God as "good" or "perfect".
Allow me to elaborate - when it is said that certain things in nature show God cannot be good, skeptical literature often points to one of 2 things:
1) because some things in nature appear to have flawed design, God appears to be a poor designer.
2) if evil exists in the world, then God cannot be good
We might deal more with #2 in future posts, but answering both arguments is similar. What if appearances are not what they seem? What if something interfered with God's design? What if the things we see in nature now do not reflect original design given at creation? Say, for instance, something happened along the course of history that introduced problems? For example, God proclaims a curse on his heretofore "perfect" creation and mankind is suddenly needed to care for it? (Genesis 3:17-19) What if there was a worldwide flood that permanently altered biochemistry and geology in ways unpredictable by standard models? (Genesis 7:11-24)
Or what if some things were designed to ultimately adapt and change to various environments? What if "chaos" itself was even part of God's design? (not a popular argument, or even necessarily sound, but one with some good linguistic evidence) Do any of these things then point a bad finger to God, or to our narrow attempts to understand his ways of operation? Do these truly prove, beyond doubt, that God is not good? Or do they merely prove that God allowed a certain level of chaos to enter the world, which is responsible for the universe's flaws?
Hume's arguments against teleology are not the only challenges, of course. Other challenges face the argument, and we must look at them as well. The first is that if nature itself (or the universe) is naturally complex, it would indeed suffice as the "intelligent" designer, and that no outside force would be needed. Or, if we grant that God is the designer, he must be much more complex than his creation, and for that to be so is just as improbable as random chance giving way to purpose. The problem with the first view is it does no better job of avoiding a regress than positing God as a designer. It also begs the question - why is the universe that complex? The problem with the 2nd view is it fails to accept the notion of God as being uncreated and uncaused, and therefore not subject to the laws that apply to the created universe(as we saw in the cosmological argument).
There is also debate over what it means to say the design argument is the "best" explanation for the evidence. How is it determined that certain features must be designed? It is difficult to do so without being subjective, so this line of questioning is best left untouched. Our per-commited bias in evaluating such information will always force us to choose or reject explanations based on our views own views. I have seen atheists refuse to accept supernatural explanations for anything (virgin birth) merely on the basis that such explanations are not testable. And as we looked at in our first post on this subject, this is stacking the deck, and such a complaint can just as easily be thrown at a creationist who would refuse to accept that natural processes could have caused something (when at issue is whether or not natural processes would have caused everything).
Finally, what about alternative explanations to design? Frankly, providing alternatives does not suffice to undermine an argument. At best, it only calls into question the premises of the argument, which can simply be adapted to reach the same conclusion (much as William Lane Craig has done withthe Kalam Cosmological Argument). Even if an alternative explanation is accepted, such as random chance or multiple universes, it does nothing to prove God could not be behind such a process (whether or not you personally believe he is). It just shows that he is not needed for the explanation, and that moves the issue within the scope of the cosmological argument. This is why I have tried to say we should never take just 1 argument as complete proof for our case.
In the end, the teleology argument remains a strong one, and I have not even dived into "fine-tuning" aspects of the debate (the fact that conditions needed for the universe to operate as it does can be calculated to have an impossibly high chance of being the result of random processes). Much like the cosmological argument, it cannot identify a specific entity as the designer. In fact, as shown, some proponents appeal to natural explanations as the designer (including Darwinian evolution). But design ultimately makes a case for the necessity of some such high-order force at work. Just as with the cosmological argument, I believe when we carefully define the intelligent being without speculation (ie, random chance could have caused it), we have something to test for fitness to the evidence. In turn, we can narrow down identities for the designer and reveal the problem with arguments like #3 from Hume's list (which show up often in philosophical debates). This, of course, means we have to put natural explanations to test as well, and in the future I hope to do just that (if I determine how to best organize such a presentation).
Some sources used to stoke my thought processes are as follows:
- [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleological_argument
- Accessed 01/10/2012
- [2] Ratzsch, Del, "Teleological Arguments for God's Existence", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/teleological-arguments/>.
- Accessed 01/10/2012
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)