God's Existence, Part 4 - Final Cause

Moving on in our discussion of philosophical proofs for God, I will now take a look at what is likely the 2nd most popular argument for the existence of God. It is called the teleological argument, or argument from design (purpose), as teleology is the study of "final" causes (purpose). Because the argument is based on what we observe and know (complexity in nature), it is also what philosophers call an a posteriori (after the fact) argument.

The argument is rooted in the phenomena that things in nature appear to have a specific, guided purpose or design. The universe, and all of nature, always behaves the same way, predictably and perfectly, as if designed. Because human thought is also aimed towards purpose this way, a similar (but superior) intelligence must be behind the order and existence of nature. This intelligence, of course, is what we call God. The alternative explanation is that such complexity is the product of chaos or random causes - but that eliminates any "purpose" or guidance. Not to mention, the odds of such happening (order coming from random chance) are so highly improbable as to be unlikely.

For Christians, this is an easy argument to understand. Humanity was created in God's image (Genesis 1:27), and scholars frequently point out this means they reflect God's abstract (not physical) qualities - thought, emotion, authority, etc. So, just as we perceive and design complex structures ourselves, God is able to do so on an infinitely greater scale, and has done so with the universe. This makes sense of what we see in nature above our ability to comprehend. That the universe itself operates on fine-tuned and reliable laws practically begs for attention to be given towards an ultimate designer.

The origins of this argument, as with many, trace back to classical Greek philosophers. For instance, Plato, Aristotle and Socrates are some of the earliest known minds to develop teleological arguments. Because the concept seems so "natural", however, many minds have contributed to the argument over time. For this reason, and because there are so many variations, I will not go into much history. Some of the more notable contributors, however, include Augustine, Thomas Aquinas (a name that will feature in most philosophical debates) and William Paley (creator of the famous "watchmaker" analogy - that if I see a watch and know nothing about watches, I would be inclined to conclude it did not assemble itself).

To evaluate the argument closer, let's look at 1 generic formulation of the argument, which should give us a platform from which to discuss details and weaknesses.

1. An object in nature (or nature itself) is like a product designed by human intelligence (a machine) because it has specific complex qualities
2. This product (machine) has complex qualities because it is a product of human intelligence
3. Similar effects often have similar causes (or explanations)
4. So it is likely that this object in nature has the same qualities because it is also a product of similar intelligence.

So what can be wrong with this seemingly simple logic? What objections might there be? Because the argument is so popular, prevalent and seemingly obvious, few solid critiques were ever offered until David Hume took up his pen in the 1700's. He presented these challenges:

1. Most of nature is not similar to human products (machines) but to living beings.
2. Similar affects could have different causes
3. Even if an intelligence could be suggested, some flawed elements of nature would make that intelligence appear different from the traditional view of God (perfect and benevolent)

So how are we to respond to these challenges? What validity do they have? First, since Hume's time many scientists and skeptics, whether fans of design arguments or not, have agreed that an abundance of things in nature clearly have the appearance of having been designed. It is only through their intention to explain things apart from design that such individuals reject design arguments. Anyway, the original argument is not entirely clear - in what ways do definitions of a living being contradict characteristics for a machine? Why should they be mutually exclusive, except that "living beings" are not the immediate product of humans. But isn't the design argument aimed at showing the same "designer" was responsible for purpose in each? (both human and animal)

On the 2nd point, just because there could be different causes for similar effects does not make it likely or assured. Empirical evidence must be introduced to show conclusively that 2 things appearing similar in nature are caused by different genetics (that will never happen) or different sources. Even evolution does not posit such things, but holds to common ancestry as the source of common traits.

The next argument is perhaps the weakest. It fits hand-in-glove with declarations that philosophical arguments cannot confirm a specific God. This is true, but is that relevant? If you can prove that common (or traditional) views of God are false, does that mean there cannot exist a view of God that still conforms to what we see in nature? Also, what if our common ways of understanding God are flawed? Indeed, it has been my experience that this is the case when skeptics cry about something disproving God as "good" or "perfect".

Allow me to elaborate - when it is said that certain things in nature show God cannot be good, skeptical literature often points to one of 2 things:
1) because some things in nature appear to have flawed design, God appears to be a poor designer.
2) if evil exists in the world, then God cannot be good

We might deal more with #2 in future posts, but answering both arguments is similar. What if appearances are not what they seem? What if something interfered with God's design? What if the things we see in nature now do not reflect original design given at creation? Say, for instance, something happened along the course of history that introduced problems? For example, God proclaims a curse on his heretofore "perfect" creation and mankind is suddenly  needed to care for it? (Genesis 3:17-19) What if there was a worldwide flood that permanently altered biochemistry and geology in ways unpredictable by standard models? (Genesis 7:11-24)

Or what if some things were designed to ultimately adapt and change to various environments? What if "chaos" itself was even part of God's design? (not a popular argument, or even necessarily sound, but one with some good linguistic evidence)  Do any of these things then point a bad finger to God, or to our narrow attempts to understand his ways of operation? Do these truly prove, beyond doubt, that God is not good? Or do they merely prove that God allowed a certain level of chaos to enter the world, which is responsible for the universe's flaws?

Hume's arguments against teleology are not the only challenges, of course. Other challenges face the argument, and we must look at them as well. The first is that if nature itself (or the universe) is naturally complex, it would indeed suffice as the "intelligent" designer, and that no outside force would be needed. Or, if we grant that God is the designer, he must be much more complex than his creation, and for that to be so is just as improbable as random chance giving way to purpose. The problem with the first view is it does no better job of avoiding a regress than positing God as a designer. It also begs the question - why is the universe that complex? The problem with the 2nd view is it fails to accept the notion of God as being uncreated and uncaused, and therefore not subject to the laws that apply to the created universe(as we saw in the cosmological argument).

There is also debate over what it means to say the design argument is the "best" explanation for the evidence. How is it determined that certain features must be designed? It is difficult to do so without being subjective, so this line of questioning is best left untouched. Our per-commited bias in evaluating such information will always force us to choose or reject explanations based on our views own views. I have seen atheists refuse to accept supernatural explanations for anything (virgin birth) merely on the basis that such explanations are not testable. And as we looked at in our first post on this subject, this is stacking the deck, and such a complaint can just as easily be thrown at a creationist who would refuse to accept that natural processes could have caused something (when at issue is whether or not natural processes would have caused everything).

Finally, what about alternative explanations to design? Frankly, providing alternatives does not suffice to undermine an argument. At best, it only calls into question the premises of the argument, which can simply be adapted to reach the same conclusion (much as William Lane Craig has done withthe Kalam Cosmological Argument). Even if an alternative explanation is accepted, such as random chance or multiple universes, it does nothing to prove God could not be behind such a process (whether or not you personally believe he is). It just shows that he is not needed for the explanation, and that moves the issue within the scope of the cosmological argument. This is why I have tried to say we should never take just 1 argument as complete proof for our case.

In the end, the teleology argument remains a strong one, and I have not even dived into "fine-tuning" aspects of the debate (the fact that conditions needed for the universe to operate as it does can be calculated to have an impossibly high chance of being the result of random processes). Much like the cosmological argument, it cannot identify a specific entity as the designer. In fact, as shown, some proponents appeal to natural explanations as the designer (including Darwinian evolution). But design ultimately makes a case for the necessity of some such high-order force at work. Just as with the cosmological argument, I believe when we carefully define the intelligent being without speculation (ie, random chance could have caused it), we have something to test for fitness to the evidence. In turn, we can narrow down identities for the designer and reveal the problem with arguments like #3 from Hume's list (which show up often in philosophical debates). This, of course, means we have to put natural explanations to test as well, and in the future I hope to do just that (if I determine how to best organize such a presentation).



Some sources used to stoke my thought processes are as follows:

• [1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleological_argument
• Accessed 01/10/2012
• [2] Ratzsch, Del, "Teleological Arguments for God's Existence", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/teleological-arguments/>.
• Accessed 01/10/2012