God's Existence, Part 5 - Greatest Good

This time we will be looking at what is known as the ontological argument for God. Ontology is a study of the nature of existence. Therefore, the ontological argument would be something like this: if I can conceive of a being whose nature is greater than anything else in the universe, then it must exist. Behind this logic is a chain of reason that goes like this: since humans can still understand things we do not see, there is still reason to believe they exist.

The origin of this argument only dates back to the 11th century, when St. Anselm of Canterbury first proposed the most popular form of it. [1]  However, it was not then used as proof of God's existence. Anselm instead was sharing it as part of his mental reflections on God (much like I do here). He already assumed God's existence. It would be the popular mathematician, Rene Descartes (inventor of the "cartesian" x/y coordinate system for graphing mathematical equations) who would first use the argument in favor of God's existence. [2]  He put God's existence on par with other mental abstracts such as numbers and shapes. Just as geometry can be inferred from the existence of shapes, or math from the existence of numbers, God can be deduced from the fact that we can conceive of Him. Furthermore, he clarified that if "existence" is perfect or desirable as an attribute, and God is the complete perfection of all attributes, then God must have the "attribute" of existence.


Somewhat later, German philosopher Leibniz, agreeing with Descartes, saw the need to further clarify that in order for God to be conceivable (naturally "understood"), his attributes must be coherent (understandable). [3]  In other words, God must have omniscience (all-knowledge), omnipresence (present everywhere) and omnipotence (complete power), or else he can not naturally be a "most supreme" being. This opened a new area of evaluation for the argument, which more modern philosophers like Kurt Godel and Alvin Plantinga would included as part of their more formal, logical versions of the ontological argument. [4]  With this clarification, the argument is at it's strongest and most logical.

It also at this point that criticism becomes most important to address. If it can be shown that God can not possibly hold all 3 of these attributes - if He does not have complete power, or does not know everything - it could be disputed that such a "most supreme" being exists. And, in general, skeptics believe this is where traditional views of God fail. For example, are omniscience and omnipotence compatible? If God is powerful enough to create beings with free will (who can make their own decisions), then how can he know everything they will decide? Or, can God be both perfectly just (giving everyone what they deserve) and perfectly merciful (giving people less than they deserve)? Kenneth Himma sees these objections as the death blow to the ontological argument. [5]

This is why I've stressed so many  times we need to be careful how we define the "God" (or "designer", or "first cause") that we propose belief in, and how we understand the words we use. In doing so, we can knock down the traditional walls that stand in the way of belief. Some people I have spoken with very much would agree with the skeptics above, that God as traditionally explained does not seem very logical. And I must concede, they are right. But if we can define God to unbelievers in a way that is logical, we might be able to help knock down more walls in the battle for minds.

So how do we respond to these arguments?

Regarding mercy and justice, the problem is that mercy, as defined (someone receiving less than they deserve), has only more recently taken on this meaning, and only then in certain societies (those oriented towards individualism).  The origins of the word mercy - the Latin merces - literally mean "price paid", and referred to a reward owed someone for good behavior. [6]  So in the world of most philosophers, and most people who have lived, to have mercy meant you paid a personal (not monetary) debt (price) to someone who earned it! [7]  Applied to God, this means he does favors for people who deserve them - he rewards them as they are due. (a very simple example would be answering prayers) In this sense, mercy actually compliments justice (giving people what they deserve), and the 2 concepts are not in any contradiction!

Moving on to the objections about free will and omniscience (without getting into the details of the argument), Himma is misguided. If God knows we will do something, are we really not "free" to do it? This can only be said to be true if God has determined what will happen as a result. But why must this be so? What if free will simply means we can make decisions without being forced into them? Can't we determine our outcomes independent of God's knowledge of them? If this is not a comfortable thought, perhaps the alternative offered by CS Lewis is. If we perceive God as being outside time-space, He does not need to know what will happen before it happens. Instead, he can see all events taking place at once - past, present and future.[8]  This way he remains omniscient regardless of what choices are made about the future. Only humans are restricted to time-space, acting randomly within their own perception of time but not outside God's. The only way free will interferes with omniscience is when we narrowly define "free will".

As opposed to the teleological argument, which I said was post priori (after-the-fact), you can see the ontological argument so far has nothing to do with facts whatsoever. It completely relies on evaluating if/then scenarios. This makes it a classic example of what is an a priori argument (before-the-fact). It is an exercise of logic that does not speculate about the nature of the universe. It focuses instead on the plausibility of the belief. This, of course, is also what proves to be the source of most criticism of the argument. How can something be proven to exist if no observation is available?

The first was Hume's primary objection, as you should come to expect from anything he evalutes. It is also the same type of objection Immanuel Kant, an 18th century German philosopher, would raise. [9]  He saw the argument as more of a "truth" than reality because it relies on if/then logic. If shapes exist, it is true they must conform to certain properties. If God exists, then it is true he must have the "perfect attributes" ascribed to him. In each case I must accept the premises to for the argument to hold. To know, in reality, whether or not God exists is a separate matter that requires concrete or testable "experience".

As I mentioned in previous posts, this thinking at best rejects abstract realms of perception from the outset. For instance, what about the existence of a spiritual realm? "It must not be there since we can not observe it", Hume would say. But isn't that presumptuous? If it is an abstract concept, shouldn't abstract proofs be enough? Why should only physical evidence be valid criteria? After all, the whole realm of mathematics is a beautiful mix of abstract concepts and concrete rules working together to explain the universe. Hume-an rational like this only begs questions and shows a narrow approach to the realms of information and knowledge.

Whether or not the argument represents reality, in a true sense it is one that comes almost completely from imagination. The fact that it centers around what we can "conceive" has proven to be a source of criticism even from other believers! Gaunilo, a Benedictine monk from Anselm's time, pointed out that this type reasoning could be used to prove that just about anything must exist. For instance, if I can conceive of the "perfect island", I can use the same logic to show that it too must exist. Thomas Aquinas rejected the idea that God can even be fully knowable, so he cannot be "conceived" of in the way Anselm suggests. [10]

However, since God's "attributes" were shown earlier to be coherent, we are not proving "anything" we can imagine, as Gaunilo objected. We are proving a specific definition of God and his qualities - all-powerful, all-knowing and ever-present. Regarding Aquinas' objection, this would be the rallying cry of much of the emergent church movement. But it is merely a challenge to whether or not God would want to be knowable, perceiving Him as less infinite or majestic if he is. He is still taken to be an existent being, whether or not you agree being "knowable" is an attribute he would have.


 In the end, as I have said before, it is tough to agree that offering criticisms for an argument make the argument useless. The criticisms offered for each of the arguments we've looked at so far merely inform us of the argument's limits and help us redefine it. To reject ontology on grounds related to concrete evidence, when it still supports God as an abstract concept, is misguided.  Taken with other arguments (cosmology, teleology) that offer concrete evidence, the ontological argument gives us part of the bigger picture of God. It shows God's existence through His perfection - standing in opposition to some natural force or "Big Bang". The existence of such things, if proven, are ultimately more convenient than "perfect".




[1] "Ontological Argument." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument>.

[2] ibid
[3] ibid
[4] ibid

[5] "Ontological Argument for the Existence of God [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/ont-arg/>.


[6] "Definition of Mercy - Merriam-Webster's Student Dictionary." Merriam-Webster's Word Central. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://www.wordcentral.com/cgi-bin/student?mercy>.

[7] Pilch, John J., and Bruce J. Malina. Handbook of Biblical Social Values. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1998. 93. Print.
[8] C. S. Lewis Mere Christianity Touchstone:New York, 1980 p.149

[9] "Ontological Argument." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Web. 17 Jan. 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument>.

[10] ibid